St. Thomas Aquinas follows Aristotle's view of the forms, and holds that each object is constituted by its form and its matter. Thomas then describes souls as substantial forms of living creatures. He then distinguishes plant souls as vegatitive souls, animal souls and sensitive souls, and human souls as rational or intellectual souls.
Human rights seem to be defined based on what humans are. To oversimplify, if we are by nature free, then coercion is immoral. If humans are by nature capable of rational thought, then brainwashing one is a violation of his, or her, rights. Violating a human is quite simply done by violating what he, or she, is.
What I bring up today is the notion that violating the rights of an animal would be constituted by doing damage to an animal qua animal. If Thomas is right in believing that the soul of an animal has certain qualities and may be labelled as a sensitive soul (capable of feeling things not unlike pain and joy), but not a rational soul (animals are not capable of things like language and free thought, worship in the human-to-divine sense, music, art, etc.), then animal rights are grounded in sensitivity and feeling.
Thus, causing undue pain to an animal violates its rights.
"A righteous man cares for the needs of his animal,
but the kindest acts of the wicked are cruel."
-Proverbs 12:10
Human rights seem to be defined based on what humans are. To oversimplify, if we are by nature free, then coercion is immoral. If humans are by nature capable of rational thought, then brainwashing one is a violation of his, or her, rights. Violating a human is quite simply done by violating what he, or she, is.
What I bring up today is the notion that violating the rights of an animal would be constituted by doing damage to an animal qua animal. If Thomas is right in believing that the soul of an animal has certain qualities and may be labelled as a sensitive soul (capable of feeling things not unlike pain and joy), but not a rational soul (animals are not capable of things like language and free thought, worship in the human-to-divine sense, music, art, etc.), then animal rights are grounded in sensitivity and feeling.
Thus, causing undue pain to an animal violates its rights.
"A righteous man cares for the needs of his animal,
but the kindest acts of the wicked are cruel."
-Proverbs 12:10
“Thus, causing undue pain to an animal violates its rights.”
ReplyDeleteI’m not sure if this is implying a soft or hard view of animal rights. For instance, what about the painless killing of a cow? Would that be a violation of an animal’s right? I suppose the argument for that would go something like this.
1. Animals qua Animals have the capacity to feel.
2. Destroying animals makes them unable to feel.
3. It is a wrong to destroy a sensate soul’s capacity to feel.
4. It is wrong to kill an animal.
Do you agree with the conclusion? If not, what premise would you deny?
I think you left an important premise out in you construal of human rights, and that might have implication for the prospects for animal rights. It’s true, as you say, human rights are derived from what humans are, but you missed the role happiness plays in explaining why it is wrong to violate what a human is. The reason why undue coercion is wrong is because a coerced soul cannot adequately instance happiness, i.e. to coerce someone is to deprive them of their wellbeing. It’s not simply violating a things’ nature that is wrong, for if that were the case, then violating any substantial form would be wrong (e.g., turning a tree into lumber for the purposes of building a house is destroying a vegetative soul), and that is just obviously false.
Now according to Aristotelian categories humans are intellectual/rational souls, and this is what provides them with the capacity to experience wellbeing. Animal souls, on the other hand, are irrational, and therefore do not have the capacity for wellbeing. Since animal souls are not capable of virtue, violating their natures is not immoral.
It doesn’t follow that we can torture animals for fun, however. But the reason why torturing animals for fun would be wrong is because it would be irrational for us to do so, i.e. torturing an animal for fun does not cultivate any of the virtues. So there is some sort of code for how we ought to treat animals, but it’s not in virtue of animals having rights.
In this case I am less concerned with approaching the issue by way of meticulous analysis (a virtuous endeavor, no doubt) and more concerned with a general but reasonable and only slightly out of the ordinary glance at animal rights.
ReplyDeleteThus, rather than zooming in on each and every possible proposition one might affirm or deny, and the consequences entailed by the direction a cold but stranglingly logical journeyman might take at every node, I am relatively content to zoom out and handle concepts at the echelon of the following:
As rudimentary as it sounds, pain is basically bad. Animals are capable of experiencing pain. Therefore, causing undue pain to animals is cruel and should be avoided if possible.
Perhaps it would help my case to approach the matter from a different angle on the same plane, and to describe cruelty as a vice, or to exult some virtue that is depleted by entertaining cruel thoughts and intentions or exhibiting cruel behavior.
Or perhaps some audiences would be affected by a scientific and philosophical (for it must be both [<--willing to discuss]) exploration of the conscious experience of pain that animals may undergo.
I suppose that the demonstration of the relevance of certain, more foundational, reasoning to my position would suffice to drag me into the slow-going but ultimately (hopefully!) fruit-bearing, quantum-level analytical drudgery necessary for making rock-solid but concretely quantifiable rounding out of an animal rights philosophy built on bullet-proof and absolutely conclusive syllogisms.
For the topic at large, if convinced of the relevance of such ground-zero reasoning, I just might be willing to indulge. Then again, maybe not.
Perhaps I am content to simply list humans as rational and sensitive and therefore beings, which ought not be unnecessarily hurt or coerced. And animals as beings, which experience pain and therefore ought not be caused it if possible.
I'm gonna be honest with you. Upon reflection it seems there may be something I am not interacting with that may be relevant to my position (as vague as it is, admittedly). If one lists "existence" as a virtue of both animal and human (and vegetative!) souls, my argument proves too much. If existence is a virtue of such souls, then just as wrong as it may be to cause an animal undue pain would be the act of taking its life unnecessarily.
Am I using "virtue" appropriately (not that term definitions are very important, but they are helpful when striving toward specificity and ease of communication)?
Can this be solved by listing existence as an accidental property? What are the implications of this? Is the matter interesting enough to pursue? Isn't the pursuit itself enjoyable enough regardless of the topic? Isn't it more efficient to pursue topics of eternal consequence nevertheless? Isn't this topic of some eternal consequence? Are all topics of eternal consequence created equally? What does it mean for a topic to bear eternal consequences?
That's enough. Let me stop right there.
Actually, I intended to stop even before I issued the imperative to allow me to. Not that the imperative contained any girth or played too important of a rhetorical role. Forgive the waste of characters constituted by the clause in question, as well as that which followed, including this.
That brings us to the present.
On, like a jazzist, to interact with your words instead of my own.
I think it sounds fun to address each of your questions in turn, taking only those as questions that have a question mark at the end.
First up: "For instance, what about the painless killing of a cow?"
Since the painless killing of a cow doesn't cause said cow any undue pain, my argument is powerless to stop it.
Next.
"Would that be a violation of an animal’s right?"
If it is considered a rights violation to deplete any thing by which a thing is what it is, and if existence is one such thing, then depleting it would be one such violation and thus the answer would be yes.
Let me be forthcoming with my (theoretically) temporary agnosticism regarding an animal's right to life and the caveats attached to such a hypothetical right.
Thus perhaps "I don't know" would be more apropos.
"Do you agree with the conclusion [that it is wrong to kill an animal]?"
I immediately lean toward "no". I can argue for my leaning by building upon matters external to the topic at large by reasoning thusly:
God probably killed the first animal as implied by Genesis 3:21 (if one wants to contest this, I can dig up plenty of other instances that support the claim that God has personally killed at least one animal). God is omnibenevolent (I happen to know my audience is composed primarily by classical theists who will admit this proposition). Therefore killing an animal is not [morally, necessarily] wrong.
Naturally, one might contest such an argument by arguing with premise one based on a different interpretation of that passage (or any other I am able to dig up), by undermining the veracity of the Bible (or the canonicity of any Biblical book I cite), etc.
Or, one might contest this by pulling some sort of reformed move that involves absolving God of the moral categories that apply to humans (or that we think apply).
I am interested in dialoguing with neither the first interlocutor, nor the second, for they are both monsters (I am willing to argue for this claim, however).
Does anybody realize the irony in my willingness to argue for the monstrosity of those who disagree with me, albeit not with those who disagree with me? Doesn't this amount to a public solicitation of one with whom to gossip about the depraved moral state of those with whom we disagree? Isn't this damn funny? No? Then leave my blog immediately and never return.
I'm just kidding baby, come back. Come back to me. Please read my blog. Baby, please.
"If not, what premise would you deny?"
Off the cuff, I would deny premise 3. My argument was against the moral acceptability of causing an animal undue pain, not destroying it's ability to feel.
This brings me to the end of your questions (as defined above).
Now it sounds fun to interact with a few of your comments.
"The reason why undue coercion is wrong is because a coerced soul cannot adequately instance happiness"
I am not convinced of this, and I am not sure I properly understand your meaning. What do you mean by "happiness"? Can you present a formal argument for this claim (the claim cited, not your definition of happiness - for I am willing to use whatever definition you supply for the sake of interacting with your truth claims instead of wantonly definition-mongering).
"It’s not simply violating a [thing's] nature that is wrong, for if that were the case, then violating any substantial form would be wrong (e.g., turning a tree into lumber for the purposes of building a house is destroying a vegetative soul), and that is just obviously false. "
Good point. I will have to think about this.
"Now according to Aristotelian categories humans are intellectual/rational souls, and this is what provides them with the capacity to experience wellbeing. Animal souls, on the other hand, are irrational, and therefore do not have the capacity for wellbeing."
I suddenly realize that I have some Aristotle to catch up on. Would you kindly define "wellbeing" in context?
"Since animal souls are not capable of virtue, violating their natures is not immoral."
I am embarrassed at my ignorance. But alas, your degree was in philosophy whilst mine was not. If I promise to do my homework, would you kindly define "virtue" as Aristotle does? Then I can reflect and issue a statement of affirmation or denial.
"It doesn’t follow that we can torture animals for fun, however. But the reason why torturing animals for fun would be wrong is because it would be irrational for us to do so, i.e. torturing an animal for fun does not cultivate any of the virtues. So there is some sort of code for how we ought to treat animals, but it’s not in virtue of animals having rights."
While I admit I do not understand the entirety of your argument, I will be forthcoming about my immediate repulsion at this conclusion. I disagree that every irrational act is immoral (think of twiddling your thumbs or clicking your heels), and I am not convinced that animals do not have rights. Perhaps you are not arguing that animals do not have rights, but that the moral acceptability or reprehensibility of certain actions toward animals is not grounded in such rights. Care to offer further clarification on your view?