Friday, September 4, 2009

A Critical Review of Gordon H. Clark's "God And Evil: The Problem Solved": Part VII

I have been journalling through Gordon H. Clark's "God And Evil: The Problem Solved" with a posture of openness to what the author has to say and honesty concerning my criticism of it. So far the work has largely comprised philosophical arguments attempting to undercut the idea of libertarian free will, which I have found unconvincing. I just finished reading through two sections that seem like they ought to be reviewed together, "Responsibility and Free Will" and "The Will of God".

Clark says that Free Will theory begins with God's goodness, and reasons from there. It attempts to maintain divine goodness in the face of evil, by placing the responsibility for evil on the heads of free agents whom God created. When Free Will theorists are faced with challenges to their view posed by Calvinists, they often ask what alternative Calvinism can possibly present. While Calvinists accuse Free Will theory of failing to maintain a robust view of divine omnipotence and omniscience, Free Will theorists accuse Calvinism of failing to maintain a robust view of divine goodness.

Clark believes that he has already shown that any notion of free will is logically incompatible with omnipotence and omniscience and fails to solve POE. And so now he promises to show how human responsibility and divine goodness can be possible under determinism, and how deterministic Calvinism resolves POE.

He quotes from someone who says that very few of even the most rigorous Calvinists would say that if a man gets drunk and shoots his family, it is the will of God. Clark, on the other hand very frankly and pointedly asserts that if a man gets drunk and shoots his family, it is in fact the will of God.

Though this seems contrary to scriptures, as though God could will something He does not will (drunkenness and murder), there is a way to resolve it. God, according to Clark, has a revealed will (or precepts) and a decretive will (or providence). In this way, God is able to verbally tell people to do one thing, but cause them to do another. Thus, Calvinism avoids self-contradiction.

He offers as an example, the story of Abraham and Isaac. God temporarily commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son (God's revealed, preceptive will), but secretly intended to keep Abraham from doing so (God's secret, decretive will).

Clark concludes these two sections by declaring that "if Arminians had a keener sense of logic they would not be Arminians!".

I think Clark is right about the different starting places of Calvinists and Free Will theorists. One starts with God's love and is therefore willing to limit the application of His power, and the other with His power and is therefore willing to limit the application of His love.

I think love is the right place to start, based on John's statement that God is love, and Jesus' statement that the most important thing for a human being to do is love God and love other human beings. I would much rather get love right at the expense of erring in my consideration of other divine attributes, than get omnipotence right at the expense of erring in my consideration of love.

On top of that, I think that Free Will doesn't require us to dilute our understanding of omnipotence anyway. It only requires us to consider that God does not fully exercise it all the time.

But the nature of love is different than the nature of power. By virtue of the fact that love is relational, it cannot be withheld in the same way that power can. The choice not to apply power in a certain circumstance does not mean God is any less powerful, but any choice not to be loving would in fact mean that God is less loving. A man who can bench-press 500 lbs. is powerful enough to do so whether or not he is actively doing it. But a man who withholds his love from some of his children while giving it to others in the same context is less loving by exactly that much.

Calvinism gets both facts backwards. It holds that God must fully apply His power in all circumstances to be omnipotent, and as a consequence He arbitrarily limits His love to some while withholding it from others. In this way, Calvinism starts in the wrong place and is misunderstood about the nature of the thing it starts with anyway (omnipotence), and as a consequence grossly misunderstands the nature of love.

Free Will theories, on the other hand, start where we should, with love, and everything else falls into place.

Now concerning God's secret will, by which He unequivocally determines whatsoever comes to pass, and His revealed will, by which He verbally commands His creatures to do good: I find this distinction, while it saves the logical coherency of Calvinism against one type of argument, to be completely ad hoc, unbiblical, and troubled by even a simple, common sensical regard.

First, the story of Abraham and Isaac cannot be seen as an example of this distinction. The reason is that all we have access to in the story is God's revealed will. God commands Abraham to kill Isaac, and then He commands Him to substitute a ram. Both commands are part of God's revealed will. Nowhere in the story do we see a description of God's secret will. It, being secret, is said to be the driving force behind nature and behind Abraham's and Isaac's behaviors. But the story doesn't tell us about the driving forces behind all of these events. The events themselves are described without mention of metaphysical mechanics. It could very well be the case that Abraham and Isaac each had free will. This story can be coherently read under either a deterministic Calvinist framework, or a Free Will framework. But it is not a conclusive example in support of either. And if this is supposedly the clearest, flagship example of the Calvinist doctrines concerning God's secret and revealed wills, it should tell us something.

Second, it must be realized that nowhere in the scriptures do we see anything remotely close to this doctrine taught. It is entirely a fabrication devised by the Calvinists to save the coherency of their philosophical system. And it is especially hypocritical of Calvinists to do this.

Third, these doctrines would have us believe that God is divided against Himself, both willing sin and not willing sin. Though there may be two different senses of "will", it is nevertheless bizarre. Why would God cause the very things He abhors, and against which His wrath burns? Take Jeremiah 19, for example. Doesn't it seem deceitful on God's part to verbally tell the people that He did not command or decree their evil deeds, and that they didn't even enter His mind (v. 5), if He was the one causing them the whole time?

Only a non-Calvinist worldview enables us to boldly and plainly hold to the simple, Biblical doctrine that God does not will evil. Evil is what is contrary to the will of God. We don't have to do any philosophical gymnastics to save our view or explain ourselves. It is plain and simple.

So Clark has shown that Calvinism might be strictly, logically coherent in the face of one particular type of objection. I am not sure how this is meant to constitute a robust account of human responsibility or divine goodness within a determinist framework or a resolution of POE, and so I guess I can only assume that all of what has been promised is yet to come. But I am truly baffled by Clark's arrogant concluding statement about Arminian logic, since this has been the first chapter in which he hasn't attempted to demonstrate logical errors in Arminianism.

4 comments:

  1. "But the nature of love is different than the nature of power. By virtue of the fact that love is relational, it cannot be withheld in the same way that power can. The choice not to apply power in a certain circumstance does not mean God is any less powerful, but any choice not to be loving would in fact mean that God is less loving. A man who can bench-press 500 lbs. is powerful enough to do so whether or not he is actively doing it. But a man who withholds his love from some of his children while giving it to others in the same context is less loving by exactly that much."

    Nice.

    "[...] I am not sure how this is meant to constitute a robust account of human responsibility or divine goodness within a determinist framework or a resolution of POE, and so I guess I can only assume that all of what has been promised is yet to come."

    Right. Notice that if you deny that we have free will, you still need to make man responsible for evil and not God, in conjunction with determinism. Put another way, the Calvinist has to show that:

    (1) Man is responsible, and

    (2) Determinism is true

    are compossible. I've yet to see how saying "God says man is responsible", or that "God is a law giver" demonstrate the compossibility of (1) and (2).

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  2. Well I guess we'll see what he says about all that in the upcoming sections.

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  3. "But the nature of love is different than the nature of power. By virtue of the fact that love is relational, it cannot be withheld in the same way that power can. The choice not to apply power in a certain circumstance does not mean God is any less powerful, but any choice not to be loving would in fact mean that God is less loving. A man who can bench-press 500 lbs. is powerful enough to do so whether or not he is actively doing it. But a man who withholds his love from some of his children while giving it to others in the same context is less loving by exactly that much."

    (1) I can conceive how God could withhold meticulous sovereignty and still retain his full power, but I struggle to see this bold assertion in Scripture, especially when it states God always does what He pleases (Ps 115:3; Job 42:2) and all things work according to His will (Eph. 1:11).

    (2) I think where your view of love breaks down is that it demands God to love all people in the same way. Can mercy be demanded? God states that he shows mercy to whom He wills. Is he required to show mercy to all in the same way? I'd stress again that man is unworthy of any good gift. God is always love, but for Him to not show love the same way to different people doesn't mean He is any less loving. Is it wrong that God unconditionally elected the nation of Israel for His purposes and not the other nations? Certainly, God showed more patience and love to Israel. Should we demand because less love was shown that wrong doing has been committed?

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  4. Dane, good to hear from you man!

    Concerning (1)
    I have to admit, I am surprised to see you merely citing common verses used to support deterministic Calvinism without providing accompanying exegesis or interacting with common objections to using them thus. Surely you know me well enough to understand that I have read these passages and not found myself convinced that they commit us to determinism! And surely you know the historical conversation about these matters well enough to know that whole traditions within Christendom - in fact the vast majority of Christians throughout history - have also found themselves unconvinced that these verses teach determinism! I'm not quite sure what you expect to happen, here... you don't think that just by citing these verses again I will finally see that the Calvinist interpretation of them is correct? Surely you wouldn't want me to so easily abandon my convictions, as newly acquired convictions under such an exchange would be just as easily abandoned.

    Ps 115:3 only says that God does what He pleases, not that God pleases to absolutely determine all things.

    Job 42:2 only says that God can do all things, not that He does all things, and that no purpose of His can be thwarted, not that His purpose is to determine everything.

    Eph 1:11 only says that we were predestined according to His purpose, without supplying details concerning predestination that exclude non-Calvinist construals of it, and that He works all things according to the council of His will, not that the council of His will is to work all things in a deterministic fashion.

    Concerning (2)
    I do not personally command God to love all people in the same way, and I don't maintain that human beings deserve mercy. After-all mercy, as a category, only includes actions which are not required.

    Therefore nothing outside of God requires Him to show mercy.

    But the scriptures tell us that God is characteristically internally motivated to be maximally merciful to all people without partiality, and that His will is for all of them to faithfully repent and be saved: Ezekiel 18:23, Ezekiel 33:11, Acts 10:34-35, Romans 2:11, 1 Timothy 2:4-6, 1 John 2:1-2, 1 John 4:8, 2 Peter 3:9, and, Psalm 145:9.

    And unlike God's functional election of Israel, which may have even come hand in hand with some temporal blessings, for God to extend eternal salvation to some of His children but not others wouldn't be a simple matter of loving the elect and the reprobate differently, but of loving the elect and not the reprobate. John Robbins, in the Forward to "God and Evil" makes this very point himself, when he says that "Biblical" Christianity resolves the problem of evil simply by denying the assumptions on which the argument is founded, one of which is that God loves all of His creatures. The problem is that a "God" who isn't love is not a Biblical God at all!

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